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The development of organized, explanatory systems of knowledge is an 
integral part of human nature; it allows us to categorize objects and events and to 
make predictions based on our experiences. In our society, the quest for answers 
to the questions "How?" and "Why?" begins early in life. By the preschool years, 
children are actively seeking and providing explanations for an abundance of 
physical and social events, and they are developing knowledge of causal forces at 
work in the environment (Bullock, Gelman, & Baillargeon, 1982; Rosengren & 
Hickling, 1999). 
Paradoxically, at about the same age at which children demonstrate they 
have a fundamental understanding of natural causal forces operating in the world, 
they are introduced by our culture to concepts and beliefs that seem to contradict 
their early theories. For example, children learn of popular superstitions (e.g., a 
four-leaf clover bringing good luck) that employ causal mechanisms outside the 
realm of natural laws governing the physical world. This concept raises the 
question of whether or not children with a fairly sophisticated understanding of 
normal causal forces believe in superstitions and, if so, how they reconcile these 
supernatural beliefs with their knowledge of natural causal relations. 
The aim of this study was to examine young children's understanding of 
superstitions. Children between the ages of 5 and 9 received a set of interview 
questions concerning their experiences with superstitions (e.g., "Do you know 
what a superstition is?"); their beliefs about the efficacy of superstitions (e.g., "Do 
superstitions always come true or just some of the time?"); and their knowledge 
of the mental and physical components of superstitions (e.g., "Do you have to 
believe it will come true for it to really happen?"). Participants also completed a 
belief task designed to assess the relative importance of belief and action in 
superstitions. 
The findings indicate developmental patterns in children's awareness of 
superstitions and beliefs in efficacy of superstitions. With age, children 
demonstrated a significantly greater awareness of superstitions. In contrast, 
children demonstrated a significant decrease in beliefs in the efficacy of 
superstitions by the age of seven. Regarding children's perceptions of the 
necessary components of superstitions, there were important similarities in the 
developmental pattern of children's responses. Across all age groups, the action 
component of a superstition (as opposed to the belief component) was found to be 
the primary factor in the effectiveness of superstitions to "bring good luck." 
These findings are discussed in relation to children's beliefs about magic, 
wishing, and prayer, and the potential modes of cultural transmission of 
supernatural beliefs. 
Vll 
Literature Review 
An essential element of human nature is our quest to make sense of the 
world. Individuals search for explanations about everything from the creation of 
the earth to why the Yankee baseball pitcher pitched a no run game. Was it the 
wind? Was it his lucky socks? Was it God? In our society, scientific evidence has 
been hailed as the most accepted method of interpreting our wondrous world. 
Both children and adults call on scientific reasoning to predict and explain events 
in their environment. Through science, "we aim for objectivity: basing 
conclusions on external validation. And we avoid mysticism: basing conclusions 
on personal insights that elude external validation" (Shermer, 1997, p. 20). 
At what point do young people begin using science as a means for 
explaining events in the world? Research demonstrates that this knowledge can 
be present even in early childhood. In fact, a growing body of empirical work 
documents children's understanding of the scientific processes that function in the 
world. For example, studies done by Leslie and Keeble (1987) and Cohen and 
Oakes (1993) indicate that even infants have a general understanding of physical 
causality. These studies systematically investigate infants' perceptions of 
causality by presenting direct launching events in which one object moves across 
a computer screen and hits a second object. The results suggest that infants as 
young as 7 to 10 months of age demonstrate an ability to recognize causal 
relationships among objects. Further research documented how preschoolers use 
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their scientific knowledge of physical causality to predict and explain a multitude 
of events (Bullock, Gelman, & Baillargeon, 1982; Goswami, 1991; Shultz, 1982). 
With such evidence of children's basic understanding of scientific 
principles, the questions arise as to when and why children use magic as a causal 
explanation of events. Magical forces not only fall outside the realm of natural 
causality but also violate children's early scientific principles. To better 
understand the interplay between magical and scientific reasoning, it is important 
to first define and explore the magical belief systems prevalent in our culture. 
Oxford American Dictionaries (Abate, 1998) defines magic as being "a 
supposed act of influencing the course of events supernaturally" (p. 359), and 
defines supernatural as "thought to reveal some force above the laws of nature" 
(p. 601). According to these definitions, magical belief systems may include — but 
are not limited to — wishing, astrology, numerology, and superstition. Such belief 
systems have existed for many centuries; for example, the superstitious act of 
knocking on wood to promote a positive outcome is thought to have first 
originated in Ancient Greece. Men of this time believed that trees housed spirits 
and sought protection from evil by touching a tree (Marmor, 1956). 
In America today, evidence of magical beliefs dominate our popular 
culture (Gmelch & Felson, 1980; Rozin, Nemeroff, Wayne, & Sherrod, 1989). 
Vyse (2000) notes that 1200 of the 1750 newspapers distributed throughout the 
nation include astrological columns, and Gallop polls from 1994 report that 25% 
of Americans believe in astrology. In addition, a multitude of television programs 
and movies, such as the X-files, Ghost, Phenomenon, City of Angels, and The 
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Sixth Sense, focus on paranormal forces such as aliens, ghosts, or Extra Sensory 
Perception. This pervasive climate of magical and supernatural beliefs may have 
direct consequences on the development of magical beliefs in children. 
Recently, a number of investigators have focused on children's magical 
beliefs and their use of magical explanations. Regarding children's beliefs in 
magical entities, parental reports as well as verbal and behavioral measures of 
young children's beliefs indicate that many children between the ages of 3 and 8 
believe in magical beings such as Santa Claus, the Tooth Fairy, the Easter Bunny, 
ghosts, and monsters (Harris, Brown, Marriot, Whittall, & Harmer, 1991; Johnson 
& Harris, 1994; Rosengren & Hickling, 1994, 1999; Woolley, 1999). In addition, 
another recently documented phenomenon involving magical beliefs is that of 
children's imaginary companions. Estimates of the frequency of children having 
imaginary companions range between 25% and 65%, with the highest incidence 
occurring between 3 and 8 years of age (Singer & Singer, 1990; Taylor, 
Cartwright, & Carlson, 1993). This information suggests a fundamental difference 
between the way children and adults perceive the realm of magic. 
However, when we look at the way in which children and adults use magic 
as a causal explanation for real world physical events, the evidence indicates that 
both adults and children resort to using magical explanations for events when they 
have no apparent physical or scientific causal explanation. In a study by Phelps 
and Woolley (1994), children between the ages of 4 and 8 were given a magical 
belief interview and a series of event tasks. Data from the interview showed an 
age-related decrease in children's beliefs in the real existence of magical entities 
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(such as fairies) and magical powers. The event task was broken into two parts: 
prediction and explanation. In the prediction section, children were asked to guess 
what might happen in a particular scenario (e.g., magnets repelling one another, a 
quarter "disappearing" in a box). In the explanation section, children were shown 
the event about which they made a prediction and asked to explain the cause of 
the event. There were four predictive variables: age; magical belief classification 
(high, moderate, low—based on the interview responses); accurate predictions; 
and availability of accurate physical explanations. Of the four variables, only the 
final factor, that of having reasonable physical explanations for the events, was 
found to account for a significant portion of the variance in children's claims of 
magic. Thus, whether or not children claimed to believe in magical entities and 
supernatural forces in the interview did not relate to their use of magic to explain 
physical events. According to this study, children are similar to adults in that 
when they have physical principles available to explain events they do not make 
use of magical explanations. 
So there appears to be a discrepancy between children's beliefs in magical 
entities (which are numerous and robust) and their beliefs that magic is a force 
operating in the real world (which is limited). In line with this difference, an 
additional distinction needs to be made between what children call "magical" and 
children's beliefs and actions that we, as adults, may call magical because they 
violate our understanding of natural causal forces. Piaget (1929) defined 
children's "magical thinking" from this adult perspective as a broad category of 
mental and physical acts that include several sub-categories: (a) "magic by 
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participation between thoughts and things" (e.g., wishing for a new bike and 
getting one); (b) "magic by participation between actions and things" (e.g., 
crossing your fingers and winning a lottery); and (c) "magic by participation 
between objects" (e.g., finding treasure buried under a four leaf clover). 
According to Piaget, young children routinely engage in these forms of magical 
thinking involving a misinterpretation of the underlying causes of physical events. 
These forms of magical thinking have less to do with the "fairy and monster" 
realm of magic than they do with wishing and superstitions. 
Several recent developmental studies have focused on Piaget's first 
category of magical thinking, "magic by participation between thoughts and 
things." These studies address children's beliefs in the power of mental-physical 
causality — that is, a mental act (e.g., imagining, wishing, or praying) having a 
physical consequence in the real world. Conceptually, imagining, wishing, and 
praying have a number of features in common, the most important being that they 
all involve internal mental processes aimed at changing the external world in 
some way. 
Woolley and Phelps (1994) investigated young children's understanding 
of imagination as an effective means of mental-physical causality. Forty-two 
children between the ages of 3 and 5 participated in a task that included a verbal 
and behavioral measure of their beliefs in the real existence of an imagined object. 
The procedure involved having a child imagine or "make a picture in their head" 
of an object inside an empty box. Children's belief in the existence of this object 
were assessed verbally ("Is there tape in this box?" and "Is it real tape or pretend 
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tape?"), and also behaviorally by testing if the child would hand the box with the 
imagined object to an adult in need of the particular object. Results show a 
difference between the beliefs and actions of young 3-year-olds as compared to 
older 3-year-olds and 4- and 5-year-olds. Young 3-year-olds were more likely to 
verbally affirm the existence of the imagined object in the box and to actually 
hand over the box to the experimenter. However, a significant majority of all 
subjects (ages 3-5) displayed a clear understanding of the nonexistence of the 
imagined contents when assessed behaviorally. Woolley and Phelps (1994) 
suggested that children under 4 years of age might experience confusion about 
whether imagining or thinking can actually change physical reality. 
Woolley, Phelps, Davis, and Mandell (1999) explored the connection 
between mental acts and the physical world in a second type of magical causality 
- wishing. In a two-part study involving 92 children between the ages of 3 and 6, 
the researchers assessed children's beliefs in the efficacy and magical nature of 
wishing. In one task, children were asked to state whether events were magical or 
ordinary. The events included commonly portrayed magical events (e.g., frog 
turning into a princess) and nonmagical events (e.g., flipping on a light switch and 
a light coming on). Children also were asked if a wish coming true would be 
magical or not magical. Results indicate that older children (5- and 6-year-olds) 
classify wishing as a magical event, as do the younger children (3- and 4-year-
olds); however, the majority of young children also purport that turning on the 
light is magical. In accord with the findings from the magical belief study by 
Phelps and Woolley (1994), when children are not equipped with scientific or 
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physical explanations, they may be more likely to claim the event is magical. 
Overall beliefs in the efficacy of wishing decreases in children between the ages 
of 3 and 6. 
A third form of mental-physical causality that has received recent attention 
is prayer. Prayer is similar to imagining and wishing in that the objective is to 
alter the world through a focused thought, but with prayer, there is the added 
element of a divine intermediary, such as God. In a study by Woolley and Phelps 
(2001), 3- to 8-year-old children were asked structured interview questions and 
instructed to respond to tasks designed to assess their concepts of prayer. Children 
were asked questions such as "How does God hear your prayers?" and "Who 
makes your prayers come true?" In one task, children were asked to teach a 
puppet how to pray. Researchers examined the mental and physical components 
children reported as characteristic of prayer (e.g., bowing head, clasping hands, 
thinking). The results support a clear developmental trend, with 3- and 4-year-
olds claiming the physical aspects of prayer (closing eyes) are more important 
than mental ones (thinking), and 7- and 8-year-old children claiming that mental 
components are more important than the physical ones. Concerning beliefs in the 
efficacy of prayer, at age 4, children begin having a general idea that prayer 
"works" and this belief appears to increase through age 8. 
Very little research has been done to address Piaget's second and third 
categories of magical thinking: "participation between actions and things," and 
"participation between objects and objects." These forms of magic are more 
closely related to what we commonly view as superstitions, such as knocking on 
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wood or picking a four leaf clover for good luck. Tobacyk (1991) describes 
superstition as the tendency to create an "illusory correlation." He defines an 
illusory correlation as one in which people imagine or overestimate relationships 
between two variables. Similarly, Alcock (1995) defines superstition as "the 
interpreting of two closely occurring events as though one caused the other, 
without any concern for the causal link" (p. 15). A more culturally relativistic 
definition suggests "superstition should be reserved for beliefs or practices 
groundless in themselves and inconsistent with the degree of enlightenment 
reached by the community to which one belongs" (Marmor, 1956, p. 119). While 
this definition implies a very negative view of superstitions, it also allows for 
knowledge and beliefs systems to evolve within a culture. 
Alcock (1995) states that 19th century thinkers believed that universal 
education would lead to a decrease in superstitious beliefs. However, he claims 
that "high literacy rates and universal education have done little to decrease such 
beliefs" (p. 15). Superstitious beliefs are evident in individuals with and without 
formal education as well as in both rural and urban areas. Vyse (2000) suggested 
that people with a college education may be more likely to subscribe to social and 
occupational-specific superstitions, such as exam or business related superstitions. 
Blum (1976) reported that within American society as a whole, there is abundant 
evidence of beliefs in many common superstitions (e.g., walking under a ladder 
brings bad luck, crossing your fingers brings good luck). 
Why are these beliefs so prevalent in a culture that strongly supports 
scientific methods of inquiry and scientific explanations? Anthropologist 
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Bronislaw Malinowski suggests the "theory of the gap" to explain the ubiquity of 
superstitious beliefs and acts (as cited in Campbell, 1996). His theory states that 
despite our vast array of scientific knowledge, uncertainty still exists regarding 
the underlying causes of many events, and this uncertainty leads people to 
experience anxiety about the unknown. When an individual lacks control, feels 
uncertain, or is without information about the outcome of an event, he/she may be 
more prone to superstitious beliefs and behavior (Jahoda, 1969; Keinan, 1994). 
For example, a student who feels anxious about taking an exam may feel 
compelled to pick up a penny off the floor, in hopes that it will bring good luck. 
Similarly, a first time flyer might knock on wood after hearing a flight attendant 
boast of that airline's safety record. These acts permit the individual to gain some 
sense of control over an uncertain outcome. As Zeiler (1972) states, "superstition 
refers to behaviors which are emitted as if they have environmental consequences, 
but in fact do not" (p. 2). 
A perfect example of this type of behavior is evidenced in a study 
conducted by Rozin, Markwith, & Ross (1990). Adult subjects were given two 
glasses of water. The subjects observed sugar being added into each glass and 
then instructed to place labels on the glasses: one read CYANIDE and the other 
read SUGAR. When encouraged to drink from both glasses, subjects consistently 
preferred to drink from the glass labeled SUGAR. Despite placing the labels on 
each glass themselves, people avoided the water labeled CYANIDE due to the 
fear of a possible link between the liquid and the poison. 
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As adults, these illusory correlations may be compelling, even though our 
rational side refutes them. Campbell (1996) utilizes the idea of a half-belief to 
explain this phenomenon. He describes individuals who may negate the idea of 
bad luck, but purposely avoid walking under a ladder. Oftentimes, he claims, 
people may realize that a belief is irrational or unjustifiable, yet still perform the 
superstitious act. If there is a high cost to performing the act (e.g., people are 
watching, or it is difficult to walk around the ladder in a particular setting), one is 
less likely to do it. However, if there is a low cost to behaving superstitiously 
(e.g., no one is around, or it is just as easy to walk around the ladder as it is to 
walk under it), people may choose the superstitious route just in case there may 
be some type of causal connection. 
These findings in the adult literature bring into question how children, like 
adults, might employ superstitions in their struggle to make sense of and control 
their world. To what extent are children knowledgeable of superstitions? Do they 
view superstitions as a credible means of causality? What do children perceive to 
be the roles of belief and action in superstitions? The purpose of this study is to 
explore young children's understanding of superstitions and to further inform 
three areas of development: (a) children's magical beliefs and use of magical 
explanations, (b) children's magical thinking as defined by Piaget's three sub-
categories of magical thinking, and (c) children's superstitious beliefs and acts as 
compared to those of the adult population. It is expected that children will exhibit 
knowledge of superstitions later than they demonstrate knowledge of magical 
entities and wishing, but about the same age as they begin forming concepts of 
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prayer. It is unclear at this point whether children's beliefs in the efficacy of 
superstitions will show a decline by the age of 9, as is the pattern with magical 
beliefs and wishing, or if their beliefs will continue to increase through the early 
elementary school years, as is evidenced with prayer. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants in this study were 80 children between the ages of 4 and 9 
with an equal number of males and females. The sample consisted of 25 4- to 5-
year-olds (mean age = 5;1; range = 4;7 - 5;7), 25 6- to 7-year-olds (mean age = 
7;2; range = 6;7 - 7; 10), and 30 8- to 9-year olds (mean age = 9;2; range = 8;8 -
9;7). Children were recruited from two public schools. Each of the public schools 
used in this study serves a population of students in which approximately 67% 
meet eligibility for free and reduced lunch program. This study was approved by 
the Human Subjects Review Board of Western Kentucky University (see 
Appendix A). 
Materials 
Belief interview. The complete set of interview questions is included at 
the end of this document (see Appendix B). Following the interview format used 
in similar studies (e.g., Woolley & Phelps, 1994; Woolley & Phelps, 2001; 
Woolley, et al., 1999), this survey was used to address children's knowledge of 
and beliefs in superstitions. The subjects were given the opportunity to answer a 
structured format of open-ended and forced choice questions concerning 
superstitions. More specifically, questions probed children's knowledge of 
superstitions, beliefs in the efficacy of superstitious acts, and understanding of the 
necessary components (mental and/or physical) of superstitions. First, children 
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were asked, "Do you know what a superstition or saying about luck is?" 
(Question 1). If subjects answered this question affirmatively, they were asked, 
"Can you explain what it is to me?" (Question 2), and "What would be an 
example about something that brings good or bad luck?" (Question 3). 
Participants also were asked: "Do you believe that is true?" "Has it ever happened 
to you?" and "Did it really work?" (Questions 3a, 3b, 3c). 
Children then were presented with the following sayings: "Step on a crack, 
break your mother's back" and "Find a penny, pick it up, all day long, you'll have 
good luck." Following each saying they were asked, "Have you ever heard of that 
saying?" "Do you think that it is true?" "Have you ever done that?" and "Did it 
really work?" (Questions 4a-d, 5a-d). Next, children were asked, "Can you think 
of any other special beliefs or sayings that bring good or bad luck?" (Question 6). 
Children's concepts of luck were further explored in Questions 7 - 1 5 : 
"Do you think there is really such a thing as luck - having good luck or bad 
luck?" "What are some examples of things that might happen if you have good 
luck?" "What are some things that might happen if you have bad luck?" "Can 
anyone have good luck?" "Do some people have more good luck than other 
people, or is it even? If so, then who?" "What do you have to do to get good 
luck?" "Can anyone have bad luck?" "Do some people have more bad luck than 
other people, or is it even? If so, then who?" "What do you have to do to get bad 
luck?" 
Children were asked if they had heard of a number of objects bringing 
good luck (four leaf clovers, rubbing a rabbit's foot, knocking on wood, a pencil, 
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crossing your fingers, a horseshoe, and the number seven - Question 16a-g) and of 
a number of objects bringing bad luck (breaking a mirror, stepping on a spider, 
walking under a ladder, black cat crossing one's path, touching a window, spilling 
salt, and the number thirteen - Question 17a-g). Neutral items (i.e., a pencil 
bringing good luck and touching a window bringing bad luck) were included in 
the lists to insure children were not always responding affirmatively. If subjects 
had heard of the specific objects bringing good or bad luck, they were asked about 
its efficacy: "Do you think it really works?" Participants also were asked, "Do 
special beliefs or sayings for luck always come true or just some of the time?" 
(Question 18). 
To evaluate children's perceptions of the mental and physical components 
of superstitions, they were asked, "Do you have to really believe it will work for it 
to come true?" (Question 19), and "When special beliefs come true, is it because 
somebody does something to make it come true, or because it just happens?" 
(Question 20). 
Final items assessed whether children believed people or things (kids, 
grown-ups, babies, cats and dogs, flowers, and tables) can have knowledge and 
beliefs regarding luck (Questions 21a-f, 22a-f). 
Belief task. The belief task protocol and stimuli are included at the end of 
this document (see Appendix C and Appendix D). The belief task was 
administered immediately following the interview. The main objective of this task 
was to determine the perceived relative importance of mental (belief) and/or 
physical (action) components of superstition in order for a desired outcome to 
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occur. Twelve scenarios were presented in random order. The characters in each 
scenario were engaged in one of the following behaviors: picking up a penny, 
picking a four-leaf clover, and crossing fingers. All three superstitions were 
presented in each of the following four ways: no belief/action, belief/no action, 
belief/action, and no belief/no action. The following were examples of one set of 
scenarios: "This is Juanita. She is sitting on a bench. Juanita sees a penny on 
heads. She does not believe that picking up a penny on heads will bring good 
luck. She reaches down and picks up the penny, anyway." (no belief/action); 
"This is Holly. She is going to school. Holly sees a penny on heads. She believes 
that picking up a penny on heads will bring good luck. She has to go to school, so 
she does not pick up the penny." (belief/no action); "This is Tony. He is walking 
to the park. Tony sees a penny on heads. He believes that picking up a penny on 
heads will bring good luck. He walks over to the penny and picks it up." 
(belief/action); and "This is Darren. He is going to his friend's house. Darren sees 
a penny on heads. He does not believe that picking up a penny on heads will bring 
good luck. He walks away from the penny without picking it up." (no belief/no 
action). As a memory check, children were asked if the character (a) believed in 
the superstition, and (b) performed the superstitious act. The children then were 
asked to predict if the character would have good luck. 
Procedure 
An informed consent document (see Appendix E) was distributed to 
potential subjects in preschool, first, and third grades. Those who returned this 
form received WKU pencils regardless of whether their parents allowed them to 
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participate in the study. Only students whose parents consented participated in 
the study. 
Two graduate and two undergraduate students were trained on the 
standardized administration of the belief interview and the belief task. Prior to 
conducting the belief interview and task, each examiner demonstrated proficiency 
in testing procedures. Interrater reliability was successfully performed during 
practice administration sessions. The four examiners were grouped in two pairs 
of reader and scribe to conduct the interviews and tasks. 
Within the schools, children were individually removed from their 
classrooms and led to a quiet area for a 15- to 20-minute session. Time was first 
spent establishing rapport with each subject followed by the belief interview and 
the belief task. 
Results 
Children's Awareness of Superstition 
Data were omitted for two 4-year-old participants due to their inability or 
unwillingness to respond to the interview or tasks. In the belief interview, 
children first were asked, "Do you know what a superstition or saying about luck 
is?" (Question 1); only 22% of all children answered this question with a response 
of "yes." When presented with specific superstitious objects, many children 
reported having heard of the object bringing good luck. analyses (p < .05) 
indicate no significant age differences for five of the seven superstitions 
presented. Collapsed across age, the following percentages of children claimed 
that they had heard of these good luck superstitions: a lucky penny, 55%; rubbing 
a rabbit's foot, 35%; a horse shoe, 48%; the number seven, 33%; and knocking on 
wood, 16%. Analyses of children's responses to the same question regarding two 
other superstitions indicated significant developmental differences for 5-, 7-, and 
9-year olds, respectively for four leaf clovers, 40%, 92%, 97% and crossing your 
fingers, 52%, 88%, 97%. In each of these patterns, the responses of the 5-year-
olds were significantly different from the 7- and 9-year olds, but the 7- and 9-year 
olds were not significant from one another (Fisher's PLSD, p < .001). 
As a manipulation check for random positive response sets, a pencil was 
included as a neutral item. Twenty-six percent of all children reported having 
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heard that a pencil brings good luck. This high proportion of claims that pencils 
are lucky may, in part, be due to children's familiarity with an episode of the 
popular television program "Arthur" where the characters have a magic pencil. 
Only four of the 81 children interviewed, all of which were in the 5-year-old 
group, demonstrated positive response sets, in that they answered "yes" to having 
heard of all eight good luck superstitions. The results from questions concerning 
bad luck will be presented in a separate paper with a study designed to further 
investigate children's knowledge and beliefs about bad luck. 
In order to assess children's overall knowledge of superstitions, children 
were assigned a total knowledge score. In questions 5a, 16a, 16b, 16c, 16e, 16f, 
16g, children were asked if they had heard of particular objects bringing good 
luck. Children's affirmative answers were scored as 2 for "don't know," 1 for 
"maybe," and negative responses were coded 0 for "no." Adding the scores on 
these seven questions yielded a total knowledge score, ranging from 0-14. Mean 
total knowledge scores were 7.1, 7.8, and 9.6 for 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds 
respectively. An ANOVA yielded significant main effects of age on knowledge. 
Post Hoc tests indicate that knowledge increases significantly between the 5- and 
9-year-olds, but not the 5- and 7-year-olds or between the 7- and 9-year-olds 
(Fisher's PLSD,p<.05). 
To evaluate another aspect of children's knowledge about superstitions, 
children were asked about which entities know about and believe in superstitions. 
There were no significant age differences in children's responses regarding 
grown-ups, kids, and tables. Across all age groups, 70% of the children report that 
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grown-ups know about these sayings and 53% of children claim that grown-ups 
believe in these sayings. Fifty-five percent of all children report that kids know 
about these sayings and 70% claim that kids believe in superstitions, whereas only 
10% of children claim that tables have knowledge of superstitions and 13% state 
that tables believe in superstitions. A developmental pattern emerged regarding 
babies, cats and dogs, and flowers knowing about and believing in sayings for 
good and bad luck (See Table 1 and 2). For each of these entities and objects, 
there was a significant decrease in affirmative answers to both the knowledge and 
belief questions from the 5-year-olds to the 7- and 9-year-olds (Fisher's PLSD, p 
< .001). The older children were significantly less likely to claim that these 
entities had knowledge of superstitions and believed they would really come true. 
Table 1 
Percentage of Responses Regarding Entities Having Knowledge of Luck 
Children's Responses 
Entity No Don't Know Yes 
Kids 
All Agesa 30 15 55 
Grown-ups 
All Ages3 
Babies 
5-year-olds 
7-year-olds 
9-year-olds 
20 
68 
92 
97 
10 
4 
4 
3 
70 
28 
4 
0 
20 
Cats and Dogsb 
5-year-olds 
7-year-olds 
9-year-olds 
Flowers 
Tables 
5-year-olds 
7-year-olds 
9-year-olds 
All Ages3 
56 
96 
87 
56 
100 
93 
88 
0 
4 
10 
0 
0 
3 
44 
0 
3 
44 
0 
3 
10 
aAge groups were combined when no significant differences were found. 
bDecrease in affirmative answers were found from 5-year-olds to 7-and 9-year olds. 
Table 2 
Percentage of Responses Regarding Entities Having Beliefs in Luck 
Children's Responses 
Entity No Don't Know Yes 
Kids 
All Ages3 
Grown-Ups 
All Ages3 
Babiesb 
5-year-olds 
7-year-olds 
9-year-olds 
18 
35 
48 
80 
83 
13 
13 
4 
12 
7 
70 
53 
48 
8 
10 
21 
Cats and Dogsb 
5-year-olds 36 4 60 
7-year-olds 84 4 12 
9-year-olds 83 3 13 
Flowersb 
5-year-olds 40 0 60 
7-year-olds 80 4 8 
9-year-olds 97 0 3 
Tables 
All Ages" 88 0 13 
aAge groups were combined when no significant differences were found. 
bDecrease in affirmative answers were found from 5-year-olds to 7-and 9-year-olds. 
Efficacy Beliefs 
In addition to assessing children's knowledge of superstitions, the 
interview was designed to assess children's beliefs in the efficacy of superstitions 
- whether they would "really come true." Participants who responded 
affirmatively to having heard of superstitions or sayings about good luck were 
asked if they believed these sayings "really work" (5d, 16a2, 16b2, 16c2, 16e2, 
16f2, 16g2). %2 analyses (p < .01) on children's affirmative responses indicate 
developmental differences for three of the seven superstitions. For the 5-, 7-, and 
9-year-olds, respectively, the percentages were as follows: four-leaf clovers, 28%, 
56%, 72%; rubbing a rabbit's foot, 48%, 12%, 12%; and knocking on wood, 28%, 
0%, 3%. There were no significant age differences for four of the seven items, 
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thus the reported percentages are collapsed across the three age groups: finding a 
penny, 26%; horse shoe, 28%; crossing your fingers, 45%; the number seven, 
20%. 
For these same seven questions, a total belief score was computed by 
coding affirmative answers as 2, "don't know" or "maybe" as 1, and negative 
responses as 0, for a possible 0-14 score. Mean total belief scores were as follows 
for 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds, respectively: 11.7, 9.4, 9.1. An ANOVA yielded a 
significant main effect of age on belief, F (2,77) = 6.562, p < .01. Post Hoc tests 
indicate that beliefs in the efficacy of superstitions declined significantly between 
the 5-year-olds and the 7-year-olds, and between the 5-year-olds and 9-year-olds, 
but not between the 7- and 9-year-olds (Fisher's PLSD, p < .05). Analyses of the 
belief interview questions indicate no significant effects of gender. 
Necessary Components 
In the belief task, children's understanding of the mental (i.e., belief) and 
physical (i.e., action) components of superstition were assessed. Children were 
presented with 12 scenarios, and after each scenario, they were asked three 
questions. The first two questions were intended to be manipulation checks to test 
whether subjects attended to the stories (e.g., "Did Juanita believe that picking up 
a penny on heads would bring good luck?" and "Did Juanita pick up the penny on 
heads?") The third question asked whether the good luck would really happen 
(e.g., "Do you think Juanita will have good luck?") Responses to the second 
question indicated children of all ages attended to the tasks (across all ages, 97% 
answered correctly). However, ANOVAs yielded significant developmental 
differences in children's accurate responses to the first memory check question 
regarding the character's stated beliefs: no beftef/action sets, F(2,75) = 19.945, p 
< .0001; the belief/no action sets, F(2,75) = 21.510, p < .0001; the belief/action 
sets, F(2,75) = 6.329, p < .05; and the no belief/no action sets, F(2,75) = 3.678, p 
< .05 (see Table 3). The youngest age group was significantly less accurate in 
their ability to recall the story character's stated belief in each of the four 
conditions of the 2(belief/no belief) x 2 (action/no action) design (Fisher's PLSD, 
P < .05). They were especially poor in recalling this information in the two 
conditions where action and belief were contradictory. 
Table 3 
Percentage of Children's Accurate Recollection of the Character's Belief 
Age Group 
Scenario 5-year-olds 7-year-olds 9 year-olds 
Belief / Action 69 85 95 
No Belief / Action 29 79 82 
Belief / No Action 26 75 80 
No Belief / No Action 69 93 95 
Note. Significant differences were found between 5-year-olds and the 7- and 9-
year-olds for each scenario. 
Developmental differences emerged in children's responses to the third 
belief task question. In three of the four scenarios (belief/action, no belief/action, 
and no belief/no action), 5-year-olds produced significantly more claims that good 
luck events would occur than did 7- and 9-year old children (see Table 4). Older 
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children were more inclined to respond "maybe" when asked if the good luck 
would happen than were younger children (0%, 13%, 19%, for 5-, 7-, and 9-year-
olds, respectively). In contrast to these age differences, there were important 
similarities in the developmental patterns of children's responses. Across all age 
groups, the belief/action scenarios produced the highest rate of affirmative 
responses (82%, 67%, 63%) for 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds, respectively), followed by 
the no belief/action scenarios (71%, 60%, 49% for 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds, 
respectively). Scenarios with no action produced far fewer affirmative responses 
(belief/no action, 32%, 23%, 40%; no belief/no action, 39%, 20%, and 14%, for 
5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds, respectively). Analyses on belief task data indicate no 
significant effects of gender. 
Table 4 
Percentage of Children's Claims that Good Luck Events Would Really Occur 
Age Group 
Scenario 5-year-olds 7-year-olds 9 year-olds 
Belief / Action 82 67 63 
No Belief / Action 71 60 49 
Belief / No Action 32 23 40 
No Belief / No Action 39 20 14 
Discussion 
The purpose of the present study is to explore the development of 
children's knowledge and understanding of superstitions and their beliefs 
regarding supernatural causal forces. The findings of this study document a 
growing awareness of superstitions in the early elementary years. Although some 
5-year-old children were familiar with specific superstitious objects and events, 
there was increased familiarity with superstitions by 9 years of age. This 
burgeoning knowledge is exemplified by a 9-year-old's comment, "I know what 
good luck and bad luck is. If you find a four-leaf-clover, you get good luck. If 
you break a mirror, you get 7 months bad luck." The acquisition of this 
information may be due to a greater exposure to superstitions from parents, 
siblings, peers, and media. 
Even though the increase in knowledge is not evident until age 9, a 
significant decrease in children's beliefs in efficacy appears earlier - by the age of 
7. Although by this age, children still have a relatively limited awareness of 
superstitions, they are beginning to develop skepticism about the ability of a 
superstition to have an effect on the world. However, even with this skepticism, 
some children, like adults, still continue to consider luck a possible means of 
causality. As one 7-year-old explained, "Lacey has good luck because boys like 
her"; another claimed, "People who have money are lucky." It appears that at 
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times, children are more likely to use the general concept of luck than to buy into 
formal superstitions such as "Find a penny, pick it up, all day long you'll have 
good luck." 
Why might children subscribe to the notion of luck? Recall that Campbell 
(1996) described a half-belief as superstitions upheld even though they may 
contradict one's rational beliefs in the chance that they have some causal effect on 
the world. A 9-year-old described this uncertainty by saying a superstition is 
"when you believe in something and it might work or not." Another 9-year-old 
explained a superstition's limitations by stating that it only "works on little 
things." With evidence of adults' half-beliefs (Campbell, 1996; Rozin, et al., 
1990), it is not surprising that children would adopt this approach. One child 
described his reasoning for believing in the four-leaf-clover superstition as, "My 
dad thinks it's good luck." Evidence of this developing uncertainty was also 
apparent in the observed increase of the older groups' chosen response of 
"maybe" when asked if the character in the belief task would have good luck. No 
5-year-old children answered "maybe" to this question; whereas, 7-year-olds 
answered "maybe" an average of 13% of the time and 9-year-olds did so 19% of 
the time. The older children hesitated to declare full acceptance or denial of a 
superstition's ability to be effective. 
The results of the belief task indicate there was consistency across ages in 
the purported necessity of action when determining if a superstition would really 
occur (averaged across all three age groups: beliet7action, 70%; no belief/action, 
59%; belief/no action, 32%; no belief/no action, 24% ). Notice that in scenarios 
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involving action without belief, children claimed that it would really occur over 
half of the time; whereas, they claimed so only a third of the time in belief 
without action scenarios. As adults, we frequently engage in superstitious 
behaviors while we concurrently admit to not believing in them (Blum, 1976; 
Campbell, 1996; Rozin, et al., 1990). One could speculate that the physical 
component of doing something - taking action - may give an individual more 
confidence in the outcome of an event rather than simply proclaiming a belief. 
An additional goal of this research is to investigate how children's 
developing concepts of superstitions relate to Piaget's categories of magical 
thinking. Previous studies of children's concepts of imagination, wishing, and 
prayer (Woolley & Phelps, 1994; Woolley & Phelps, 2001; Woolley, et al., 1999) 
addressed Piaget's first category of magical thinking, "magic by participation 
between thoughts and things." The present study was specifically designed to test 
Piaget's second and third categories, "magic by participation between actions and 
things" and "magic by participation between objects and objects." In the study 
conducted by Woolley et al. (1999), children demonstrated an awareness in 
wishing as early as 3 to 4 years of age. This prevalence of knowledge in such 
early years was also seen in studies on magical entities and magical powers 
(Harris, et al., 1991; Rosengren & Hickling 1994, 1999). The present study 
suggests that knowledge of superstitions appears later, between the ages of 7 and 
9, similar to the pattern of children's knowledge of prayer (Woolley & Phelps, 
2001). 
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As regards children's belief in the efficacy of supernatural events, studies 
on children's understanding of magic (Phelps & Woolley, 1994) and wishing 
(Woolley, et al., 1999) suggest that children's beliefs in these processes working 
in the real world decrease with age. A similar pattern emerges in this study of 
superstitions; 7- and 9-year-olds are less likely to report that a superstition will 
"really work" than 5-year-olds. Interestingly, the opposite pattern was found in 
studies on prayer; children's beliefs in the efficacy of prayer increased through the 
early elementary years. Undoubtedly, this increase is a function of prayer being 
more strongly supported by our culture as an acceptable form of supernatural 
influence. It would be striking to find a culture in which superstitions were more 
accepted and encouraged by the adult population than religious beliefs and 
practices. In this case, we would expect to find beliefs in prayer being almost 
nonexistent and an increase with age in beliefs in the efficacy of superstitions. 
Most often, children's beliefs will conform to the adult norm in the culture 
surrounding them. 
Limitations 
A few limitations of this research should be noted. The order of the 
response choices in four of the questions in the belief interview (Questions 11, 14, 
18, and 20) may have influenced the subjects' responses. The options were 
presented in only one order, and thus there may have been a preferred choice 
based on ordering. In addition, a different selection of a good luck neutral item 
(other than pencil) may have been more effective in identifying positive response 
sets. Also, the demographics of each group (SES, race, and disabilities) were not 
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recorded or analyzed, thus these findings may not be generalizable to the 
population as a whole or to specific subgroups. 
Future Research 
The findings from this study add to our knowledge of children's 
understanding and usage of magical belief systems. As evidenced by this 
research, children become more aware of superstitions throughout their early 
elementary years, but their beliefs in the power of superstitions having an effect 
on the world decrease with age. Most of the participants across all ages in this 
study rated action as the primary determinant of a superstition's effectiveness. 
Additional research is needed to assess the origins of children's 
knowledge and beliefs regarding superstitions. What is the relative importance of 
parents, siblings, peers, and media in the formation of this knowledge? Regarding 
individual differences, is the environment the primary determinant of children's 
superstitious beliefs (children in the same environment have similar beliefs) or are 
children differentially disposed to being "believers" (given the same 
environmental exposure, some children will be skeptics whereas others will be 
credulous.) Other factors potentially related to individual differences include 
children's scientific knowledge, experiences with supernatural outcomes, 
susceptibility to peer influence, fantasy proneness, and religiosity. 
Previous studies (e.g., Phelps & Woolley, 1994) indicate children have a 
natural proclivity to disbelieve in evil magical entities. Recognizing this 
reservation in beliefs in negative entities and events, future research could 
investigate the extent to which children believe in superstitions that result in bad 
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luck. This researcher did not address children's beliefs in bad luck, but the 
question of whether children have different beliefs in good versus bad luck is an 
interesting one to examine. 
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Appendix B 
BELIEF INTERVIEW 
Subject # Location 
Birth date Exp. Initials 
Hi. My name is . What is your name? That's a nice name. Today I 
have a game to play with you. And in this game I'm going to ask you some 
questions and show you some pictures. The fun part of this is that there are no 
right or wrong answers. It's not like a test, so you can say anything that you want. 
Okay? Alright, here we go.... 
1. Do you know what a superstition or a saying about luck is? 
Yes No Other 
2. Can you explain what it is to me? 
3. What would be an example of a saying about something that brings good or 
bad luck? 
3a. Do you believe that is true? Yes No D/k 
3b. Has it ever happened to you? (Have you ever done that?) 
Yes No D/k 
3c. Did it really work? Yes No D/k 
**** 4) IF NO RESPONSE TO QUESTION 1, ASK: What about "Step on a crack, 
break your mother's back." 
4a. Have you ever heard of that saying? Yes No D/k 
4b.. Do you think that is true? Yes No D/k 
4c. Have you ever done that? Yes No D/k 
4d. Did it really work? Yes No D/k 
5) What about "Find a penny, pick it up; all day long you'll have good luck." 
5a. Have you ever heard of that saying? Yes No D/k 
5b. Do you think that is true? Yes No D/k 
5c. Have you ever done that? Yes No D/k 
5d. Did it really work? Yes No D/k 
6) Can you think of any other special beliefs or sayings that bring good luck or 
bad luck? 
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6a. Do you believe that is true? Yes No D/k 
6b. Has it ever happened to you? (Have you ever done that?) 
Yes No D/k 
6c. Did it really work? Yes No D/k 
6d. Do you believe that is true? Yes No D/k 
**** 7) Do you think there is really such a thing as luck—having good luck or bad luck? 
Yes No D/k 
8) What are some examples of things that might happen if you have good luck? 
9) What are some examples of things that might happen if you have bad luck? 
10) Can anyone have good luck? Yes No D/k 
11) Do some people have more good luck than other people, or is it even? Who? 
More Even D/k 
12) What do you have to do to get good luck? 
13) Can anyone have bad luck? Yes No D/k 
14) Do some people have more bad luck than other people, or is it even? Who? More Even D/k 
15)What do you have to do to get bad luck? 
16)Have you ever heard of four leaf clovers bringing good luck? Do you think it 
really works? What about 
16a. four leaf clovers 
Heard of it Works: Yes No D/K 
16b. rubbing a rabbit's foot 
Heard of it Works: Yes No D/k 
16c. knocking on wood 
Heard of it Works: Yes No D/k 
16d. a pencil 
Heard of it Works: Yes No D/k 
16e. crossing your fingers 
Heard of it Works: Yes No D/k 
16f. a horse shoe 
Heard of it Works: Yes No D/k 
16g. the number 7 
Heard of it Works: Yes No D/k 
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17) Have you ever heard of breaking a mirror bringing bad luck? Do you think it 
really works? What about 
17a. breaking a mirror 
Heard of it Works: Yes No D/k 
17b. stepping on a spider 
Heard of it Works: Yes No D/k 
17c. walking under a ladder 
Heard of it Works: Yes No D/k 
17d. black cat crossing path 
Heard of it Works: Yes No D/k 
17e. touching a window 
Heard of it Works: Yes No D/k 
17f. spilling salt 
Heard of it Works: Yes No D/k 
17g. the number 13 
Heard of it Works: Yes No D/k 
18) Do special beliefs or sayings for luck always come true, or just some of the 
time? 
Always Sometimes D/k 
19) Do you have to really believe it will work for it to come true? 
Yes No D/k 
20) When special beliefs come true, is it because somebody does something to 
make it come true, or because it just happens? Makes it 
Just happens D/k 
20a. (If someone) Who does something to make it come true? 
21) Who knows about special sayings for good or bad luck? 
21a. Do kids know about them? Yes No D/k 
21b. Do grown-ups know about them? Yes No D/k 
21c. Do babies know about them? Yes No D/k 
21d. Do cats and dogs know about them? Yes No D/k 
21e. Do flowers know about them? Yes No D/k 
21f. Do tables know about them? Yes No D/k 
22) Who believes that sayings for luck really come true? 
22a. Do kids believe they come true? Yes No D/k 
22b. Do grown-ups believe they come true? Yes No D/k 
22c. Do babies believe they come true? Yes No D/k 
22d. Do cats and dogs believe they come true? Yes No D/k 
22e. Do flowers believe they come true? Yes No D/k 
22f. Do tables believe they come true? Yes No D/k 
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Appendix C 
BELIEF TASK 
Subject # 
Birth date 
Location 
Exp. Initials 
1. Juanita - no belief/action 
Ql. Believe? Yes 
Q2. Action? Yes 
Q3. Really happen? Yes 
2. Holly - belief/no action 
Ql. Believe? Yes 
Q2. Action? Yes 
Q3. Really happen? Yes 
3. Tony - belief/action 
Ql. Believe? Yes 
Q2. Action? Yes 
Q3. Really happen? Yes 
4. Darren - no belief/no action 
Ql. Believe? Yes 
Q2. Action? Yes 
Q3. Really happen? Yes 
5. Amanda - no belief/action 
Ql. Believe? Yes 
Q2. Action? Yes 
Q3. Really happen? Yes 
6. Miriam - belief/action 
Ql. Believe? Yes 
Q2. Action? Yes 
Q3. Really happen? Yes 
7. Riley - belief/no action 
Ql. Believe? Yes 
Q2. Action? Yes 
Q3. Really happen? Yes 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
8. Malcolm - no belief/no action 
Ql. Believe? Yes No 
Q2. Action? Yes No 
Maybe 
Maybe 
D/K 
D/K 
Q3. Really happen? Yes 
9. Yolanda - belief/no action 
Ql. Believe? Yes 
Q2. Action? Yes 
Q3. Really happen? Yes 
10. Sarah - no belief/no action 
Ql. Believe? Yes 
Q2. Action? Yes 
Q3. Really happen? Yes 
11. David - belief/action 
Ql. Believe? Yes 
Q2. Action? Yes 
Q3. Really happen? Yes 
12. Erik - no belief/action 
Ql. Believe? Yes 
Q2. Action? Yes 
Q3. Really happen Yes 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
No Maybe D/K 
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TEXT TO ACCOMPANY THE PENNY PICTURES: 
1) no belief, action 
This is Juanita. She is sitting on a bench. 
Juanita sees a penny on heads. She does not believe that picking up a penny 
on heads will bring good luck. 
She reaches down and picks up the penny, anyway. 
2) belief, no action 
This is Holly. She is going to school. 
Holly sees a penny on heads. She believes that picking up a penny on heads 
will bring good luck. 
She has to go, so she does not pick up the penny. 
3) belief, action 
This is Tony. He is walking to the park. 
Tony sees a penny on heads. He believes that picking up a penny on heads 
will bring good luck. 
He walks over to the penny and picks it up. 
4) no belief, no action 
This is Darren. He is going to his friend's house. 
Darren sees a penny on heads. He does not believe that picking up a penny 
on heads will bring good luck. 
He walks away from the penny without picking it up. 
TEXT TO ACCOMPANY THE FOUR LEAF CLOVER PICTURES: 
1) no belief, action 
46 
This is Amanda. She is sitting on a grassy hill. 
Amanda sees a four-leaf clover. She does not believe that picking a four leaf 
clover will bring good luck. 
She reaches down and picks the clover, anyway. 
2) belief, action 
This is Miriam. She is playing in her backyard. 
Miriam sees a four-leaf clover. She believes that picking a four leaf clover 
will bring good luck. 
She picks the clover from the grass. 
3) belief, no action 
This is Riley. He is going to his piano lesson. 
Riley sees a four-leaf clover. He believes that picking a four leaf clover will 
bring good luck. 
He has to hurry, so he does not pick the clover. 
4) no belief, no action 
This is Malcolm. He is walking his dog. 
Malcolm sees a four-leaf clover. He does not believe that picking a four leaf 
clover will bring good luck. 
He does not stop to pick the clover. 
TEXT TO ACCOMPANY THE CROSSING FINGERS PICTURES: 
1) belief, no action 
This is Yolanda. She is going camping. 
Yolanda hopes it will be nice weather. She believes that crossing her fingers 
will bring good luck. 
Her hands are full, so she does not cross her fingers. 
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2) no belief, no action 
This is Sarah. She is in her classroom at school. 
Sarah hopes her spelling test will be easy. She does not believe that crossing 
her fingers will bring good luck. 
She does not cross her fingers before the test. 
3) belief, action 
This is David. He is waiting for the bus. 
David hopes his friend will save him a seat. He believes that crossing his 
fingers will bring good luck. 
He crosses his fingers as he waits for the bus. 
4) no belief, action 
This is Erik. He is looking at his mailbox. 
Erik hopes there will be a letter for him today. He does not believe that 
crossing his fingers will bring good luck. 
He crosses his fingers, anyway. 
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Department of Psychology 
270-745-2695 
WESTERN 
KENTUCKY 
UNIVERSITY 
Western Kentucky University 
1 Big Red Way 
Bowling Green, KY 42101-3576 
Participant Consent Form 
Dear Parents, 
Your child is invited to participate in a study of children's understanding of beliefs. 
This study is being conducted by Dr. Katrina Phelps of Western Kentucky University in 
cooperation with your child's school. The aim of our study is to better understand how children 
reason about the effects of beliefs on behavior and real world outcomes. W e will compare the 
responses children provide across different ages to learn about changes in children's 
understanding of beliefs across development. This project will be conducted in a single 20-
minute session at your child's school, at a time arranged with your child's teacher. We will 
coordinate the session with your child's teacher so that your child will not miss any important 
learning activities. 
During the session, your child will be interviewed individually and shown a set of 
pictures to evaluate and sort. Various questions about beliefs and actions related to good luck 
and bad luck will be asked; your child's answers will be recorded and kept confidential by our 
research staff. Your child is free to discuss the interview with you, but we ask children not to 
discuss their answers with their classmates. We also will show children a series of drawings of 
boys and girls who are engaged in behavior that may bring them good luck or bad luck. We 
will ask your child several simple questions about each story and ask them to sort the pictures 
into piles. Children are told that there are no right or wrong answers to these questions and to 
just say whatever they think. Our experience has been that children find our interview and 
picture tasks to be enjoyable and many ask when they can do it again. 
We would like to emphasize that your child's participation in this project is entirely 
voluntary. If you or your child decide not to participate, there will be no negative consequence 
of any sort for you or your child. Your child may refuse to answer any question and may 
withdraw from the study at any time. All information collected in this study will be kept 
strictly confidential and will only be accessible to the project staff. All results will be reported 
in terms of group averages, and no children will ever be identified by name. A written report of 
the group results will be available to you at your child's school upon completion of the study. 
The procedures in this study have been reviewed and approved by the Western 
Kentucky University Committee for the Protection of Human Research Participants. The 
University has filed a form entitled "Assurance of Compliance with D H H S regulations for the 
Protection of Human Subjects" with the Department of Health and Human Services. Specific 
questions about this study may be directed to Dr. Katrina Phelps at (270) 745-4311. Feel free 
to call if you have any concerns; we will be happy to provide you with further information. 
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We hope that you will allow your child to participate in our study. We promise 
to make it a pleasant experience and to schedule our sessions in cooperation with your 
child's teacher. Please fill out your child's name and date of birth, and your child's 
teacher's name below. To indicate consent, sign your name, and fill in the date at the 
bottom of the form. When your child returns this letter to the teacher, regardless of 
whether you respond yes or no, your child will receive a Western Kentucky University 
"Big Red" pencil. 
Thank you for your assistance. 
Sincerely. 
Assistant Professor 
Western Kentucky University 
Participant Consent Form 
Child's name: : Date of birth: 
Teacher's name: 
No. I do not give my consent for my child to participate in this study. 
Yes. I have read the information provide about this study, and give my consent 
for my child to participate in the individual interviews that are a part of the study 
conducted by Dr. Katrina Phelps of Western Kentucky University. I understand that I 
may withdraw my child from the study at any time without penalty. 
Parent's signature: Date: 
